Abstract. When commitment schemes are used in complex environments, e.g., the Internet, the issue of malleability appears, i.e., a concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary might generate commitments to values related to ones committed to by honest players. In the plain model, the current best solution towards resolving this problem in a constant number of rounds is the work of Ostrovsky, Persiano and Visconti (TCC' 09). They constructed a constant-round commitment scheme that is concurrent non-malleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. However, the scheme is only computationally binding. For application scenarios where the security of receivers is of a great concern, computational binding may not suffice. In this work, we follow the line of their work and give a construction of statistically binding commitment scheme which is concurrent nonmalleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. Our work can be seen as a complement of the work of Ostrovsky et al. in the plain model. Our construction relies on the existence of a family of pairs of claw-free permutations and only needs a constant number of communication rounds in the plain model. Our proof of security uses non-black-box techniques and satisfies the (most powerful) simulationbased definitions of non-malleability.
Introduction
A commitment scheme is a two-phase interactive protocol between two parties, the committer, who holds a value, and the receiver. It enables the committer to commit itself a value while keeping it secret from the receiver. Two basic properties of a commitment scheme are the hiding property (the receiver can not learn the committed value before the decommitment phase) and the binding property (the committer is bounded to one value after the commitment phase). In the literature, two fundamental types of commitment schemes, statistical hiding and statistical binding, are considered.
It is well known that the basic properties of commitment schemes can not prevent "malleability" attacks mounted by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) man-in-the-middle (MIM) adversary who has full control of the communication channel between the committer and the receiver. The concept of non-malleability was first introduced by Dolev et al. [1] to capture security concerns in such settings. Loosely speaking, a commitment scheme is non-malleable if one can not transform the commitment of a value into a commitment of a related value. This kind of non-malleability is called non-malleability with respect to commitment (NMc for short) [1] . This definition is based on the independence of the committed messages played by the MIM adversary with respect to the ones played by the committer. The notion of non-malleability used by Di Crescenzo et al. [2] is called non-malleability with respect to decommitment or opening (NMd for short), i.e., the adversary can not construct a commitment from a given one, such that after having seen the opening of the original commitment, the adversary is able to correctly open his commitment with a related value. This definition requires that the success probability of a MIM adversary is maintained by a stand-alone simulator. Subsequent NMc definitions are modified in a similar way [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Simulation-based definitions are much more useful when a commitment scheme is used as a building block in a larger protocol since the existence of a simulator heavily simplifies the task of proving the security of the larger protocol.
Intuitively, it seems that NMc is stronger than NMd. However, this depends on the subtleties of the definitions. Indeed this does not necessarily always hold at least with respect to non-malleability definitions in [2, 1, 3] . In a journal version of [3] , the authors [9] presented a stringent definition of non-malleability w.r.t commitment in order to imply the notion of non-malleability w.r.t opening.
Several previous results focused on designing statistically hiding commitment schemes which are NMd. Based on number-theoretic assumptions, NMd commitment schemes were designed in [10, 3] assuming the existence of a common reference string (CRS) that is shared by the two players before the protocol execution. Thus, their schemes do not work in the plain model (i.e., without setup assumptions). Recently, Pass and Rosen [4, 5] presented a slightly different definition of NMd.
3 They then constructed a commitment scheme under their NMd definition based on a family of collision-resistant hash functions in the plain model. Their scheme is round-efficient and needs only constant-round communication. More recently, based on the work of [11, 12] , Zhang et al. [13] presented a non-malleable commitment scheme under the weakest assumption, i.e., the existence of one-way functions.
Before the work of [8] , it was commonly believed that NMd (compared with NMc) is the only notion that makes sense in a computationally binding commitment scheme [1] . However, Ostrovsky et al. [8] argued that by slightly relaxing the NMc definition, 4 NMc can also be achieved for computationally binding commitment schemes. They considered concurrent MIM attacks where the adversary can simultaneously participate in any polynomial number of executions as a receiver and as a committer. Based on the work of [6, 7] , and using some techniques already introduced in [14, 15] they gave a computationally hiding and computationally binding commitment scheme which is both concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd. In a full version of [8] , they [16] further gave a construction of a constant-round statistically hiding commitment scheme which is concurrent NMd and that actually consists of a simplified protocol with respect to the one presented in [8] . The above schemes assume the existence of a family of pairs of claw-free permutations, require constant number of communication rounds only and assume that commitment phase and decommitment phase do not overlap in time.
For statistically binding commitment schemes, the first NMc one was designed by Dolev et al. [1] assuming the existence of one-way functions. However, the scheme requires O(log n) rounds, where n is the security parameter. In the CRS model, Di Crescenzo et al. [10] constructed very efficient NMc commitment schemes based on any public-key cryptosystem that is non-malleable under chosen plaintext attacks in addition to any shared-key cryptosystem that enjoys indistinguishability under plaintext oracle CCA-post attack. In the plain model, Pass and Rosen [4, 5] first constructed a constant-round NMc commitment scheme assuming the existence of collision resistant hash functions. Pass and Rosen [6, 7] then showed the NMc scheme of [4, 5] is actually a concurrent NMc one under a stronger simulation-based definition. 5 The security proofs of [4] [5] [6] [7] requires a non-black-box use of the code of the adversary and moreover the one of [6, 7] assumes that commitment phase and decommitment phase do not overlap in time. Lin et al. [12] reconsidered the scheme of [1] and presented a concurrent NMc commitment scheme using only black-box techniques. Their scheme requires a polynomial number of communication rounds and is based on the minimal assumption, i.e., existence of one-way functions. In addition to the above results focusing on NMc, the only one that explicitly claimed NMd commitment schemes was designed in [9] (see Sec. 3) in the CRS model.
provide the stand-alone simulator the value committed in the left interaction after the commitment phase is finished, while the definitions in [4, 5] do. 4 The values committed to by the adversary in a MIM execution are uniquely defined for all algorithms in the NMc definition [1, 3] , but only for PPT algorithms in the relaxed definition. More recently, the NMc definition formulated in [9] can also be applied to computationally binding commitment scheme. 5 The NMd definition in [6, 7] is stronger than that in [2] . The former is a indistinguishability-based definition, i.e., there exists a PPT stand-alone simulator that commits to a value which is computationally indistinguishable from the value committed to by the MIM adversary. The latter is a relation-based definition, i.e., the Before the clarification of [8] , another folklore belief about a statistically binding commitment scheme is that if it is NMc then it is NMd. However, at least this can not be deduced just from the simulation-based definitions in [4] [5] [6] [7] in the plain model. 6 The main problem is that the success probability of the standalone simulator is required to be only negligible close to the success probability of the MIM adversary [8] . Recall in the NMc proof [4] [5] [6] [7] , a stand-alone simulator will internally simulate the left interaction for the MIM adversary by committing to a bogus value 0 n . It seems that this simulator can not handle the NMd proof, because after receiving a committed value m, the simulator is stuck to open the bogus commitment to m.
Therefore, achieving simultaneously concurrent NMc and NMd in a constant number of rounds and under the simulation-based notions, the work of [8] achieves the strongest security for commitment schemes in the plain model. However, the scheme is only computationally binding. When the security of receivers is of a great concern in some application scenarios, it may not be sufficient. Thus, there remains an open problem as to whether or not constant-round statistically binding commitment scheme that is both concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd exists in the plain model, under the stronger simulation-based definition [6, [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Our Contribution
We solve the above problem by presenting a round-efficient protocol for concurrent non-malleable statistically binding commitment scheme. We show the following theorem. Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a family of pairs of claw-free permutations. Then there exists a constant-round statistically binding commitment scheme that is both concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd.
On a high level view, the commitment phase of our scheme is almost identical with that in [8] . The technique used in this phase is also the same. More precisely, in addition to the technique used by [4] [5] [6] [7] , the two-witness technique of Feige [17] is also employed. Our contribution lies in the modification of the open phase in order to simultaneously achieve concurrent NMd and statistical binding property. We borrow the idea of [18] in designing concurrent zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., we let the committer guess the private values committed to by the receiver in the commitment phase, and then use a witness-indistinguishable proof system to prove a carefully designed statement. In this way, the scheme is guaranteed to prevent any unbounded adversary from opening the commitment in two different ways.
Our work can be viewed as a complement of the work of [8] . Both of the work resolve the non-malleability issues against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks and achieve the same-level of security in the plain model. The main difference stand-alone simulator is less likely to commit to a value satisfying any polynomialtime computable relation than the value committed to by the MIM adversary. 6 There is no problem in the CRS model. The reader is refereed to [8] for more details.
between the two results lies in that the work of [8] focuses mainly on computationally binding commitment schemes, whereas our work considers statistically binding ones. Compared with the work of [6, 7] , our work also achieves both concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd, whereas they only achieve concurrent NMc. We emphasize here that our scheme inherits the limitation from [6] [7] [8] , i.e., the non-malleability proof heavily relies on the assumption that commitment phase and the decommitment phase do not overlap in time.
Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with witness-indistinguishable protocols, zeroknowledge protocols and commitment schemes. For more details, the reader is refereed to [19] for references.
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments and Decommitments
Next, we formulate the definitions of concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd. As stated in [6, 7] we formalize the notion of non-malleability by a comparison between a man-in-the-middle execution and a simulated execution. Let C, R be a commitment scheme. Let n ∈ N be a security parameter.
The man-in-the-middle execution. In the MIM execution, the adversary A is simultaneously participating in m(n) = poly(n) left and m(n) right interactions (WLOG, the number of commitments is the same in the left and right execution). In the i th left interaction, A interacts with the committer C to receive a commitment to a value v i . In the i th right interaction, A interacts with the receiver R and tries to commit to a valueṽ i of its choice. After the execution of the commitments in all interactions, A executes the decommitments with C and the decommitments with R. Prior to the interaction, the value vector V = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) is given to C as local inputs. A also receives an auxiliary input z, which might contain a priori information about V.
Let the random variable mim A com (V, z) denote the valuesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ m to which the adversary has committed in the right interactions. If the i th right commitment fails, or its transcript (commitment phase) equals to the transcript of any left interaction, the valueṽ i is set to ⊥.
Similarly, we let the random variable mim A open (V, z) denote the valuesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ m to which the adversary has opened in the right interactions. If the i th right commitment or decommitment fails, or its transcript (both commitment phase and decommitment phase) equals to the transcript of any left interaction, the valuẽ v i is set to ⊥.
The simulated execution. In the simulated execution, a simulator S directly interacts with an honest receiver R in m(n) interactions. As in the MIM execution, the value vector V = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) is chosen prior to the interaction, and S receives some a prior information about V as part of its auxiliary input z. S first executes the commitment phases with R. Once all the commitment phases have been completed, S receives the value vector V and attempts to decommit to valuesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ m .
Let the random variable sim Definition 1 (Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitment w.r.t Commitment [6, 7] ). A commitment scheme C, R is said to be concurrent non-malleable with respect to commitment if for every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in at most m(n) left and m(n) right interactions, there exists a PPT simulator S such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
A commitment scheme C, R is said to be concurrent non-malleable with respect to decommitment if for every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in at most m(n) left and m(n) right interactions, there exists an expected PPT simulator S such that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
..,vm)∈{0,1} n * m ,z∈{0,1} * A commitment scheme that is non-malleable according to Definition 2 is liberal non-malleable rather than strict non-malleable [1, 3] . Note we follow [4, 5, 8] in that non-malleability is guaranteed only if the commitment phase and the decommitment phase do not overlap in time.
Strong signature schemes. A signature scheme SS = (Sgen, Ssig, Sver) is said to be strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attack if no efficient adversary, with access to signature oracle with respect to the verification key VK, can output a valid message/signature pair (m, σ) with non-negligible probability. Here "valid" means that Sver(VK, m, σ) = 1 and (m, σ) does not correspond to any message/signature pair that was output by the signature oracle. A strong signature scheme is a signature scheme that is strongly unforgeable.
Constant-Round Statistically Binding Concurrent NMc and Concurrent NMd
In this section, we present a constant-round statistically binding commitment scheme that is concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd. Denote by SBCom the statistically binding commitment scheme from any one-way function [20] . Denote by SHCom the statistically hiding commitment scheme from any collection of claw-free permutation with an efficiently-recognizable index set [21] . Denote by { P tag , V tag } tag the constant-round tag-based perfect non-malleable zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (NMZKAOK) for NP [4, 5] . Denote by swiP, swiV the constant-round statistically witness-indistinguishable argument of knowledge (WIAOK) for NP [22, 23] . 7 Let cwiP, cwiV be a constant-round computationally witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge (WIPOK) for NP. Let SS = (Sgen, Ssig, Sver) be a strong signature scheme. The commitment scheme is shown in Fig. 1 . Note that all the tools used above can be achieved assuming the existence of a family of pairs of claw-free permutations.
Our commitment scheme is a statistically binding variant of the one in [8] . The commitment phase is almost identical with that of the commitment scheme in [8] with the following exception: in Stage 2, the receiver R uses a statistically hiding commitment scheme SHCom instead of a statistically binding one. It also invokes the statistical WIAOK swiP, swiV instead of a computational WIPOK. Roughly, in Stage 1, the committer generates a commitment c to v and proves knowledge of opening of c. In Stage 2, the receiver generates two commitments c 0 , c 1 to two secretes v 0 , v 1 respectively and proves knowledge of either secret. In Stage 3, the committer generates a signature to the transcripts up to now and the receiver then verifies the correctness of the signature.
The decommitment phase is more involved and needs more careful design. The main difficulty lies in simultaneously achieving concurrent NMd and statistical binding properties. We are inspired by the work of [18] on concurrent zero-knowledge proofs. We modify the scheme in [8] by letting the committer guess the private values committed to in the commitment phase and then use a WIPOK to prove a carefully designed OR statements. The construction employs the two-witness technique by Feige [17] and the well known FLS-technique [24] . Roughly, in Stage 1 , the committer first generates a commitment c to a dummy value 0 n . After receiving c , the receiver then opens the values v 0 , v 1 committed to in the commitment phase and proves knowledge of opening of either commitment c 0 or c 1 . In Stage 2 , the committer sends the committed value v and runs a computational WIPOK to prove the statements that either c is a commitment to v, or c is a commitment to v 0 or v 1 . In Stage 3 , the committer proves that c is a commitment to v, or it knows opening of c b * to v b * for some b * ∈ {0, 1}. In Stage 4 , the committer generates a signature to the transcripts up to now and the receiver then verifies the correctness of the signature. Note that the FLS-technique is used both in Stage 2 and Stage 3 .
Theorem 2. Suppose that SBCom is a statistically binding commitment scheme, SHCom is a statistically hiding commitment scheme and SS = (Sgen, Ssig, Sver) 7 Blum's basic protocol for Hamiltonicity [22] is only computational zero-knowledge with soundness error 1 2 . Moreover, the protocol includes three rounds of interaction. By running the basic protocol polynomial times in parallel, we get a computational WIPOK for Hamiltonicity. If the prover uses a statistically hiding commitment scheme [21] in the first round, then we get a statistical WIAOK for Hamiltonicity. 
R → C : Pick uniformly v0, r0, v1, r1 ∈ {0, 1} n and compute c0 = SHCom(v0; r0), c1 = SHCom(v1; r1). Send c0, c1. R → C : Pick a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. R uses witness (v b , r b ) and proves using swiP, swiV that there exist values v * , r * ∈ {0, 1} n such that c0 = SHCom(v * ; r * ) or c1 = SHCom(v * ; r * ). C : Abort if the above proof fails.
Stage 3:
C → R : Let tr0 be the transcript of the above interaction. Compute σ0 ← Ssig(sk, tr0) and send σ0. R : Verify that Sver(pk, tr0, σ0) = 1. Decommitment Phase:
Stage 1 : C → R : Pick uniformly r ∈ {0, 1} n . Compute c = SBCom(0 n ; r ) and send c . R → C : Send v0, v1. R ⇔ C : R uses witness r b and proves using swiP, swiV (with tag pk) the statement that there exists a value r * ∈ {0, 1} n such that c0 = SHCom(v0; r * ) or c1 = SHCom(v1; r * ). C : Abort if the above proof fails. Stage 2 :
C → R : Send v. C ⇔ R : C uses witness r and proves using cwiP, cwiV the OR of the following statements 1. ∃ r ∈ {0, 1} n s.t c = SBCom(v; r), 2. ∃ b * ∈ {0, 1}, r * ∈ {0, 1} n s.t c = SBCom(v b * ; r * ). R: Abort if the above proof fails. Stage 3 :
C ⇔ R : C uses witness r and proves using P pk , V pk (with tag pk) the statement that either there exists r ∈ {0, 1} n such that c = SBCom(v; r), or there exist b * ∈ {0, 1}, r * ∈ {0, 1} n such that c b * = SHCom(v b * ; r * ). R : Abort if the above proof fails.
C → R : Let tr1 be the transcript of the above interaction. Compute σ1 ← Ssig(sk, tr1) and send σ1. R : Verify that Sver(pk, tr1, σ1) = 1. is a strong signature scheme. Suppose that { P tag , V tag } tag is an one-many concurrent perfect NMZKAOK for NP, swiP, swiV is a statistical WIAOK for NP and cwiP, cwiV is a computational WIPOK for NP. Then C, R is a statistically binding commitment scheme that is both concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd.
Proof. We need to prove the scheme satisfies the following three properties: computational hiding, statistical binding, and concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd.
Computational hiding. Intuitively, the hiding property follows from the hiding property of SBCom and perfect zero-knowledge property of P tag , V tag . Suppose, on the contrary, there exists an adversary R * that violates the hiding property of C, R . Then we design an efficient adversary R that breaks the hiding property of SBCom. R proceeds as follows. On input a challenge com (i.e., a commitment to m 0 or m 1 ) from the committer of SBCom, R internally incorporates R * and forwards the external commitment com to R * in Stage 1. All other executions are emulated by R by following the honest committer strategy except that R runs the simulator for P tag , V tag in Stage 1. Finally, R outputs whatever R * outputs. From the perfect zero-knowledge property of P tag , V tag , if R * distinguishes the commitment made using C, R , then R distinguishes the commitment made using SBCom.
Statistical binding. The proof of binding property is more subtle. We show that any malicious adversary C * can not violate the binding property of C, R . Intuitively, if C * can open the commitment in two different ways, then due to the soundness property of cwiP, cwiV and the statistical binding property of SBCom, C * must use a fake witness in the execution of cwiP, cwiV in Stage 2 , i.e., it knows the witness to the statement that c is a commitment to v 0 or v 1 . Note that the only place that C * might learn v 0 or v 1 before Stage 1 is in Stage 2 of the commitment phase. Since both the commitments c 0 , c 1 are statistically hiding and swiP, swiV is statistical WI, C * learns v 0 or v 1 only with negligible probability in Stage 2. Thus, C * makes a commitment c to the value v 0 or v 1 only with negligible probability in Stage 1 . Moreover, C * commits using SBCom. So the second statement proved in Stage 2 is a false statement (even to an unbounded machine). According to the property of cwiP, cwiV , even an unbounded C * can not successfully execute the proof with non-negligible probability in Stage 2 . This reaches a contradiction.
More in details, assume for contradiction that there exists some adversary (not necessarily PPT) A that is able to violate the binding property of C, R . We show how to construct an algorithm (not necessarily PPT) A that violates the binding property of SBCom or the hiding property of SHCom or the WI property of swiP, swiV . A interacts with A and follows honest receiver strategy. Once the decommitment phase is finished, A runs the extractor of cwiP, cwiV in Stage 2 . According to the property of the extractor of cwiP, cwiV , with overwhelming probability, A gets a witness w. Then it must be the case that
. We now show however that case 1 happens with negligible probability only. Assume by contradiction, that it can happen with non-negligible probability. Then we can design an algorithm B that breaks the binding property of SBCom. B proceeds exactly as A . B then succeeds extracting r such that c = SBCom(v; r). Next, we let B keep rewinding A to the beginning of the decommitment phase until case 1 happens again. B again extracts a witness and we denote by r * the extracted witness. Let v * be the opened value by A. Now we get c = SBCom(v * ; r * ). According to the assumption of A, v = v * with nonnegligible probability. Now we find a commitment c that can be opened in two different ways. Thus, we break the binding property of SBCom.
Next we show case 2 happens with negligible probability. Suppose on the contrary, with some non-negligible probability it happens that c = SBCom(v b ; r * ). We can design an algorithm B that breaks the WI property of swiP, swiV . B then internally executes all the interactions with A and proceeds exactly as A with the only exception that the proof of swiP, swiV in Stage 2 is generated by relaying all the messages with an external prover (B submits opening information of c 0 and c 1 to the external prover. The external prover then proves using a witness for c b * for some b * ∈ {0, 1}). We emphasize here that B generates the proof of Stage 2 itself. Then B successfully simulates the interactions with A in the decommitment, and B runs the extractor of cwiP, cwiV . By looking at the extracted witness, B will guess the witness used by the external prover.
Finally, we show case 3 happens with negligible probability. Suppose on the contrary, with non-negligible probability it happens that c = SBCom(v 1−b ; r * ). We then design an algorithm B that breaks the hiding property of SHCom. Concurrent non-malleability. We need to show that the scheme is concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd. The proof of concurrent NMc is almost identical with that of the proof in [8] . Note NMc only concerns the commitment phase and as we discussed previously, the commitment phase of our scheme only deviates from that of [8] when R sends commitments and plays the WIAOK in Stage 2. Indeed, in our scheme we use statistical versions of these tools while the protocol of [8] only needs the computational versions. The proof however goes through precisely as the one of [8] . We omit the details here and defer the proof in the full version.
Next, we show it is concurrent NMd. We show that for every PPT man-in-themiddle adversary A that participates in m(n) left commitments and m(n) right commitments, there exists an expected PPT simulator S such that for every PPT distinguisher D and every negligible function µ, for every value vector V = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) where v i ∈ {0, 1} n and every z ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that
Denote by A dec the state of A after the commitment phase, i.e., A dec contains A's description along with its configuration at that time just before the decommitment phase starts.
We proceed by giving the description of the simulator S. S on input z and security parameter 1 n interacts with external honest receivers and runs the adversary A internally. During the commitment phases, on a high level, S internally incorporates A and emulates the commitment phases of all left interactions for adversary A by honestly committing to 0 n , while internally emulating the right interactions as honest receivers. After all the commitment phases end, S invokes the extractors for all the proofs provided by A in the left and right commitments to extract all the corresponding witnesses. More precisely, for each right commitment, S runs the extractor of P tag , V tag and we denote by (ṽ i ,r i ) the witness extracted in the i th right commitment. For each left commitment, S runs the extractor of swiP, swiV to get witness (v bi,i , r bi,i ) (b i ∈ {0, 1}). Next, S plays the commitment phases with external receivers. S follows the honest committer strategy and commits toṽ i in the i th commitment phase. Once all the commitment phases are finished, S receives a value vector V = (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and has to perform the decommitment phases internally with A dec . S follows the honest receiver strategy in all right decommitments. The simulation of the i th left decommitment is as follows. In Stage 1 , S acts identically as an honest committer with the exception that S commits to v bi,i instead of 0 n (using randomness r * bi,i ). In Stage 2 , S follows the honest committer strategy with the exception that it uses the "fake" witness r * bi,i to open the commitment to v i . In Stage 3 , S uses the fake witness r bi,i to complete the proof. S follows the honest committer strategy in Stage 4 . Finally, for each i, if A dec has successfully completed the i th right decommitment, then S completes the decommitment phase of the external execution with honest receivers by opening the commitment toṽ i .
Running time of S. From the construction of S, we know that S performs at most 2m extraction procedures in the commitment phases. Note that the running time of the extractions in both P tag , V tag and swiP, swiV are all expected PPT. Since the extractions are executed sequentially, the running time of all extractions is also expected PPT. Furthermore, the MIM adversary A is a PPT algorithm and therefore invoking a copy of A also requires PPT. Thus, S runs in expected PPT in the commitment phases. In the decommitment phases, since S runs in a straight-line manner and no rewinding is involved, the running time of S is strict PPT. Finally, we conclude that the overall running time of S is expected PPT.
Next, we prove that the distribution of the messages opened by A when interacting with honest committers and honest receivers is indistinguishable from the distribution of the messages opened by A when interacting with S.
Indistinguishability of the simulation. We first consider the case when there is only one left commitment and m(n) right commitments. Towards of showing Equation (1) (note V contains only a value v), we define a sequence of hybrid experiments {HYB i (v, z)} 1≤i≤7 that receive v and z as auxiliary inputs. The output of each experiment is the output of a PPT distinguisher D on input a value v and a vector of valuesṼ whose i th element is defined as follows. If the i th right decommitment completes successfully and its transcript is different from the left interaction, thenṽ i is the value opened in the i th right interaction. Otherwise,ṽ i is set to ⊥.
HYB 1 (v, z) proceeds exactly as S except that in Stage 1 of the left commitment phase, it runs the simulator of P tag , V tag . Since the simulation is perfect we conclude that
HYB 2 (v, z) proceeds exactly as HYB 1 except that in the left commitment phase, instead of feeding A a commitment to 0 n in Stage 1, HYB 2 feeds A a commitment to v using SBCom. Since both HYB 1 and HYB 2 are efficiently computable, that |p 1 − p 2 | is negligible follows directly from the computational hiding property of SBCom.
HYB 3 (v, z) proceeds exactly as HYB 2 except that it runs the simulator of P tag , V tag in Stage 3 of the left decommitment. It follows from the perfect zero-knowledge property of P tag , V tag that p 3 = p 2 .
HYB 4 (v, z) differs from HYB 3 in that it uses the real witness (i.e., decommitment of c) to complete the proof in Stage 2 of the left decommitment. It follows from the computational WI property of cwiP, cwiV that |p 4 − p 3 | is negligible.
HYB 5 (v, z) differs from HYB 4 in that it commits to 0 n in Stage 1 of the left decommitment. It follows from the computational hiding property of SBCom that |p 5 − p 4 | is negligible.
HYB 6 (v, z) proceeds exactly as HYB 5 except that it uses the real witness (i.e., decommitment of c) to complete the proof in Stage 3 of the left decommitment. It follows from the perfect zero-knowledge property of P tag , V tag that p 6 = p 5 .
HYB 7 (v, z) proceeds exactly as HYB 6 except that it does not need to run the extractor of swiP, swiV in Stage 2 of left commitment phase. Since the extraction fails with negligible probability we have that |p 7 − p 6 | is negligible.
Note that HYB 7 differs from the real game in that it runs the simulatorextractor of P tag , V tag in Stage 1 of the commitment phase. Following the description of HYB 7 we know that it opens to external receivers the values it extracts from A at the end of the commitment phase in the simulated game. Moreover, in the real game the adversary A can not open its commitments in a different way (cf. Claim 1). Thus, A opens to external receivers the values it commits to in the commitment phase. It follows from the simulation-extractability property of P tag , V tag that the simulation is perfect and the extraction fails with negligible probability in each right commitment where the tag is different from that in the left decommitment (when tags are the same, the security of signature scheme is violated). Therefore, except with negligible probability, we have that HYB 7 opens to external receivers the same values opened by A in the real game, i.e., we have that
Finally we conclude Equation (1) . This completes the proof of Theorem 2. By the statistical hiding property of SHCom and statistical WI property of swiP, swiV , we have that p 2 is essentially identical to p 3 , and therefore both p 2 and p 3 roughly correspond to p /2 − (n) where is a negligible function.
We can now conclude the proof showing that p 3 must be negligible, and thus summing up p is negligible as well, therefore A can not open in a different way with non-negligible probability. Indeed, notice that when Case 3 happens, we have that A committed to some value v * 1−b in c 1−b without having never used any opening of c 1−b in the two executions of swiP, swiV . Now in addition to the opening in the commitment phase (note B generates the commitment itself), we get two openings for SHCom. Therefore being SHCom computationally binding, this happens with negligible probability.
Extending to many-many concurrent NMd. Next, we present the proof sketch for the many-many concurrent case. We show that the two ensembles {mim 
Note that the only difference between experiment HYB i−1 (V, z) and HYB i (V, z) is that in the former A receives a commitment to v i and its corresponding decommitment generated using a valid witness in the i th interaction, whereas in the latter it receives a commitment to 0 n and its corresponding decommitment generated using a false witness.
Then we design an efficient MIM adversaryÃ that breaks the one-many concurrent non-malleability of C, R .Ã on auxiliary inputs z = (n, i, V, z) proceeds as follows.Ã internally incorporates A(z) and emulates the left and right interactions for A.Ã relays the messages in all right interactions between A and external receivers. In the i th left interaction,Ã relays either messages between an external committer and A, or messages between the simulator of the one-many concurrent case and A. 
Concluding Remarks
Our result on top of previous work shows that there exist constant-round commitment schemes that are secure also against very powerful adversaries, as long as there is a barrier in time between commitment and decommitment phase. An interesting open question concerns the possibility of achieving commitment schemes that remain secure even without such a barrier. The question is interesting even without requiring a constant round complexity. 
